Masthead by unknown
University of Missouri Bulletin Law Series 
Volume 49 August 1935 Article 4 
1935 
Masthead 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/ls 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Masthead, 49 Bulletin Law Series. (1935) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/ls/vol49/iss1/4 
This Masthead is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Missouri Bulletin Law Series by an 




Published four times a year by the University of Missouri School of Law
Board of Student editors
WILLIAM R. COLLINSON, Chairman, '35
ROBERT E. SEILER, '35 BURTON W. ARNOLD, '35
S. M. WASSERSTROM, '35 LATNEY BARNES; '35
S. R. VANDIVORT, '35 JOHN W. OLIVER, '36
CONLY L. PURCELL, '35 WILLIAM L. NELSON, JR., '36
H. TIFFIN TETERS, '35 A. D. SAPPINGTON, '36
JACK S. CURTIS, '35 G. STANLEY SHARRATr, '36
HERBERT W. JACOB, '35 LAURENCE R. BROWN, '36
ROBERT L. SPURRIER, '35 HELEN HUNKER, '36
GEORGE B. BRIDGES, '36
July, 1 1935
"My keenest interest is excited, not by what are called great questions and great
cases but by little decisions which the common run of selectors would pass by because
they did not deal with the Constitution, or a telephone company, yet which have in them
the germ of some wider theory, and therefore some profound interstitial change in the
very tissue of the law."-MR. JUSTICE HOLMES, Collected Essays, p. 269.
COMMENTS
N. R. A. LEGISLATION BEFORE THE COURTS
Immediately after the National Industrial Recovery Act became effective it
became by far the most popular subject for comment by most law periodical writers.
At least ninety articles concerning some or all phases of the Act have appeared in
the law reviews of this country. Most of these articles were in the nature of proph-
ecies, either direct or indirect, as to the reception which would be accorded the Act
by the courts in the legal controversies which it was sure to provoke. Unfortunately,
the oracular powers of those authors cannot yet be praised nor condemned, since
most of the questions they raised have not yet been determined by our Supreme
Court.
In the past few months there seems to have been a scarcity of articles concerned
with this subject. In fact, it has been possible to find law reviews which did not
contain a single article discussing the constitutional rights of ihe Blue Eagle. This
article is not inspired by any belief that this dearth is unfortunate, but is intended
as a summary of the cases which have been decided to date involving the National
Industrial Recovery Act. Classification has proved awkward, but the cases will be
discussed from the viewpoint of the various attacks which have been made upon the
Act and the codes formulated thereunder.
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(1) Does Congress have the power to regulate the transaction?
By far the greatest part of all the cases decided under the codes discuss prin-
cipally the problem of whether the transactions sought to be regulated can be con-
trolled by Congress under the commerce clause of the Constitution. This is the
first hurdle for the proponents of the codes. It appears that no other grounds for
exercising this power of regulation have been strenuously advanced, and it appears
very doubtful, in the view of past decisions, if any other grounds could be successfully
upheld. The Supreme Court has asserted that the national government derives no
powers from the general welfare clause in the Preamble of the Constitution', and
that the existence of an emergency does not create power, but may furnish the occa-
sion fot the exercise of existing power2. The few cases involving N. R. A. legislation
which mention this argument dismiss it very briefly 3, except in the case of Richmond
Hosiery Mills v. Camp 4 which held that in times of national emergency, transactions
which ordinarily would have no affect on interstate commerce, might have a burden-
ing affect, thus giving Congress the power to regulate.
Of course, it is well settled that the Federal Government has the power under
the commerce clause to regulate intrastate transactions or commerce which is bur-
dening upon or inextricably intermingled with interstate commerce,. This is, of
course, the doctrine relied upon to uphold most of the codes. Opponents rely upon
Supreme Court decisions which have held that manufacturing, mining, production
of oil, and generation of electricity are not commerce6. The question presented
in most of these border-line cases resolves itself into whether the transaction sought
to be regulated sufficiently affects interstate commerce to be a proper subject for
regulation by the federal government. Since this is the first attempt by Congress
to regulate many of these industries, there is little precedent to which the courts
can look, and consequently there is no uniformity in the decisions of the lower courts.
The case of Harry Victor et al v. Harold Ickles7, which was an attack upon the
provisions of the Petroleum Code regulating the giving of premiums in the retail
of gasoline, held that retailing gasoline was an intrastate transaction which affected
interstate commerce. The argument advanced was that the petroleum industry
as a whole covered the entire United States, and that whenever a price war started
in one locality, it spread across state lines and affected the industry as a whole, thus
affecting interstate commerce. However, in U. S. v. Suburban Motor Service Cor-
poration8 this argument was expressly denied by the court, which stated that if any
price war extended across state lines it was an accidental, secondary, and remote
result of the intrastate transaction. This court held that rules No. 2 and No. 17
of Article V of the Code of Fair Competition for the Petroleum Industry 9 were not
constitutional regulations under the commerce clause. The cases of U. S. v. Bob
1. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11, 25 S. Ct. 529 (1918); Oliver Iron M. Co. v. Lord, 262
S. Ct. 358 (1905). U. S. 172, 43 S. Ct. 562 (1923); Utah Power & Light
2. Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332, 37 S. Ct. 298 v. Pfost, 286 U. S. 165, 52 S. Ct. 548 (1932); Champ-
(1917); Home Building and Loan Association v. lin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission, 286
Blaidell, 54 S. Ct. 233 (1934). U. S. 210, 52 S. Ct. 559 (1932).
3. J. F. Purvis et al. v. Bazemore. 5 F. S. 230 7. Sup. Ct. Dis. of Columbia, Dec. 1, 1933, 61
(S. D. Fla. 1933); U. S. v. Suburban Motor Service Wash. L. Rep. 370, 2 S. C. D. C. (N. S.) 58.
Corp., 5 F. S. 798 (N. D. 111. 1934); U. S. v. S-hechter 8. 5 F. S. 798 (N. D. Il1. 1934).
8 F. S. 136 (E. D. N. Y 1934). 9. Rule 2-Any merchant who offers for sale at
4. 7 F. S. 139 (N. D. Ga. 1934). retail or wholesale, motor fuels, lubricants, gasoline, or
5. Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 33 S. Ct naptha, in so far as his business pertains to those
729 (1913); U. S. v. Ferger, 250 U. S. 199, 34 S. Ct. products, is bound by this Code.
445 (1919); Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495, 42 Rule 17-No one engaged in the sale of petroleum
S. Ct. 397 (1922). products shall give away free goods, or other things
6. U. S. v. E. C. Knight, 156 U. S. 1, 15 S. Ct. 249 of value.
(1895); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 38
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Lieto"o and U. S. v. Mills" also denied that the operation of a filling station came
within Federal regulation as interstate commerce.
The cleaning and pressing industry was held in U. S. v. Spotless Dollar Cleaners"
to come within the federal power under the commerce clause. In that case the
defendants were operating in the city of New York, but doing the actual cleaning
and pressing in a New Jersey plant. The case of J. F. Purvis, et al v. Bazemore"3,
where the transaction was carried on wholly within one state, was contra.
Two recent cases which appear to be exactly contra have come up under the
Code of Fair Competition for the Retail Lumber Trade. Both cases were prosecu-
tions for the sale of lumber below the minimum price prescribed by code authorities.
In U. S. v. Canfield Lumber Co.14 it was held that this transaction could be regulated
as a transaction in interstate commerce. The court stressed the fact that the de-
fencdant company, located in Omaha, advertised in a paper which had a large cir-
culation in Iowa, and that the company knew that much of the lumber sold from
its Omaha yard was taken into Iowa. In the very recent case of U. S. v. Sutherland
Lumber Co. 5 it was held that the selling of lumber at retail was a purely intrastate
transaction which did not affect interstate commerce, even though the lumber
might be sold to customers who would take it across state lines.
Selling an automobile under the list price and allowing more than the code
allowance for a used car in the trade-in were held not to be transactions affecting
interstate commerce in U. S. v. Kinnebrew Motor Co.",
In Hart Coal Co. v. Sparks, U. S. ltty.17 and U. S. v. Gearhart" the mining of
coal was held not to be subject to regulation as a transaction affecting interstate
commerce. In the latter case the coal was sold to wagon drivers at the mouth of the
mine, and much of it was immediately transported across the state line, but the
court denied that the government had shown that this had any effect upon interstate
commerce. In U. S. v. Eason Oil Co. 9 the drilling of an oil well was held to be an
intrastate transaction not subject to the control of the federal government, but the
power to control manufacturing as a transaction affecting interstate commerce was
upheld in Richmond Hosiery Mills v. Camp.20
Several cases have arisen under the administration of the A. A. A. involving this
problem of power under the commerce clause, especially relative to the establish-
ment of minimum milk prices. In Edgewater Dairy Co. v. JWallace"l it was held that
the sale in Chicago of milk produced in Illinois was not a transaction affecting inter-
state commerce, but U. S. v. Shissler22 held that since much of the milk sold in
Chicago came from without the state, that the sale of all milk there, regardless of
where produced, was within the current of interstate commerce.Douglas v.Wallacela
held that the sale of milk in the Oklahoma City area was wholly intrastate in nature,
and U. S. v. Neuendor24 came to the same conclusion for Des Moines
Worthy of note is the case of U. S. v. Calistan Packers25 which affirmed the
power of the federal government to allot the number of peaches which each packer
could sell.
In U. S. v. Schechter"l the court ruled on a demurrer to an indictment charging
six defendants with conspiracy to violate the N. R. A. and the Code of Fair Com-
10. 6 F. S. 32 (N. D. Tex. 1934). 18. 7 F. S. 712 (D. Colo. 1934).
11. 7 F. S. 547 (D. Md. 1934). 19. 8 F. S. 365 (W. D. Okla. 1934).
12. 6 F. S. 725 (S. D. N. Y. 1934). 20. Supra note 4.
13. 5 F. S. 230 (S. D. Fla. 1933). 21. 7 F. S. 121 (N. D. Ill. 1934).
14. 7 F. S. 694 (D. Neb. 1934). 22. 7 F. S. 123 (N. D. I1. 1934).
15. U. S. Dis. Ct., W. D. Mo., decided Dec. 27, 23. 8 F. S. 379 (W. D. Okla. 1934).
1934. 24. 8 F. S. 403 (S. D. Ia. 1934).
16. 8 F. S. 535, (W. D. Okla. 1934). 25. 4 F. S. 660 (N. D. Cal. 1933).
17. 7 F. S. 16 (W. D. Ken. 1934). 26. 8 F. S. 136 (E, D. N. Y. 1934).
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petition for the Live Poultry Industry. The alleged conspiracy was in connection
with the New York City poultry market, and the court held that this business was
within the power of Congress to regulate.
It must be remembered that in all these cases there are many arguments ad-
vanced that the business in question is a transaction affecting or burdening inter-
state commerce. In most businesses today the raw materials, or if a retail business,
the finished product, is purchased from another state. Even if the transaction
sought to be regulated is the rare instance where everything is produced, handled,
and consumed within the state, there is probably a competitive business which
operates in interstate commerce. The labor market today is said to extend over
state lines; price wars in major industries will surely cross state lines. It has been
argued that whenever a retailer undersells a competitor who purchases some of his
goods in another state, that since the competitor is losing trade he will not purchase
as much, and consequently interstate commerce will suffer.27 Just how far the
Supreme Court will extend the powers of the Federal Government under the com-
merce clause is the primary question. But certainly, if all these arguments were
given full credence by the courts, there would be few businesses over which the na-
tional government could not exercise some control.
(2) Is the Regulation Imposed a Violation of Due Process?
However, this first hurdle is not by any means the end of the constitutional
question. If the government has the power to regulate, it is then in the position of a
state government regulating an intrastate transaction urder the general police power,
and the Vth Amendment restricts the power of the Federal Government exactly
as the XIVth Amendment restricts the states. But there is very little law to be
found in the decisions under the N. R, A. on this point. The cases which deny the
power of the Federal Government under the Commerce Clause, rarely go any further,
as they need not. The decisions which uphold the power of the Federal Government
frequently dismiss the validity of the regulation with a few sentences.
The Act itself authorizes the adoption of Codes of Fair Competition for each
industry. The codes which have been adopted have provided against "destructive
price-cutting" by the establishment of minimum and "sticky" prices. The minimum
prices are arbitrarily determined "cost" prices. They have provided for minimum
wages, maximum hours of employment, and, in the case of some manufacturing
codes, for maximum "machine hours." Of course these provisions involve an en-
tirely new conception of fair competition. Selling below cost has never been held to
unfair competition by the courts before this act, and when the "cost" is an arbitrary
or hypothetical one determined by the average of the industry, it makes the question
even more doubtful.
The right of the government to fix prices has long been thought to be limited to
industries "affected with a public interest28". But in the recent case of Nebbia v.
N. Y.2 the court said that the words "affected with a public interest can, in the
nature of things, mean no more than that an industry, for adequate reason, is sub-
ject to control for the public good." Some cases decided under the N. R. A. have
27. U. S. v. Sutherland Lumber Co., supra note 28. Munnv. lllinois, 94U. S. 113(1876).
15. 29. 291 U. S. 502, 54 S. Ct. 505 (1934).
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upheld these minimum price regulations (including the forbidding of premiums30),
and at least two cases have expressly denied that these are valid regulations3".
In this connection it might be conceivably argued that the government has the
power to fix prices and that the existence of an emergency is an occasion for the ex-
ercise of this power, on the basis of some of the war-time cases 32.
The case of Richmond Hosiery Mills v. Camp 33 upheld the validity of a regula-
tion limiting the mills to the operation of two shifts a week. Williamette Valley
Lumber Co. v. Watzek"4 is another case upholding a provisions for "maximum ma-
chine hours." In that case all the mills in the district embraced by this code (about
four hundred and eighty mills) were restricted to thirty hours of operation a week.
The plaintiffs in this case had been one of the few mills operating two shifts before
the code, and this restriction cut them to thirty per cent of normal production,
whereas one-shift mills were only cut to sixty per cent of normal production. The
plaintiff had contracts which it could not perform on this limited schedule and
brought a bill to restrain the enforcement of this restriction. The bill was denied,
and the restriction was held valid, because it was unavoidable that some mills should
suffer more than others.
But in the case of Cleaners and Dyers Board of Trade v. Spotless Dollar Cleaners35
the court held invalid a blanket minimum rate which had been fixed for both "cash
and carry" cleaners, and "call, credit, and deliver" cleaners.
This problem of federal regulation of businesses completely out of the utility
field, and unaffected with, at least the older conception of, public interest is a new
field. It seems that the same considerations which guided the court in determining
the validity of legislation under the police power of states as controlled by the XIVth
Amendment should control the power of the Federal Government as limited by the
Vth Amendment.36
(3) Other Constitutional Objections to the N. R. .Until the year 1935 the Supreme Court of the United States had never held an
act of Congress invalid as a delegation of legislative power. From the famous case
of the Brig of Juroraa7 decided in 1813 there had been an unbroken line of decisions
upholding the validity of Congressional Acts attacked on this ground 3a involving
such varied matters as flexible tariff, and the condemnation of bridges which im-
periled navigation. But the first case to come before the Supreme Court involving
the constitutionality of N. R. A. legislation, Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan39, held
30. U. S. v. Spotless Dollar Cleaners, supra note
12; U. S. v. Shissler, supra note 22; U. S. v. Canfield
Lumber Co., supra note 14; Harry Victor v. Harold
Ickes, supra note 7; U. S. v. Suburban Motor Service
Corp., supra note 8.
31. Mississippi Hardwood Co. v. McClanahan,
U. S. Die. Att'y., U. S. Dis. Ct., W. D. Tenn., de-
cided Oct. 6, 1934; U. S. v. Sutherland Lumber Co.,
supra note 15.
32. Block v. Hirsch, 256 U. S. 135, 41 S. Ct. 458
(1921); Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman,
256 U. S. 170, 41 S. Ct. 465 (1921); Highland v.
Russell Car and Snowplow Co., 279 U. S. 253, 49
S. Ct. 314 (1929).
33. Supra note 4.
34. 5 F. S. 689 (D. Ore. 1934).
35. Sup. Ct., N. Y. Co., N. Y., decided Feb. 20,
1934, Federal Trade & Industry Vol. II p. 8094.
36. Adkins v. Children's Hospital of the Dis. of
Colum.. 261 U. S. 525, 43 S. Ct. 394 (1923). In this
case the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a
statute fixing minimum wages for women, and is the
last expression of the Court on this subject. The case
contains an interesting summary of all the authorities
up to that time relative to social legislation which
impaired freedom to contract.
37. The Brig of Aurora v. U. S., 7 Cranch 382
(1813).
38. Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 12 S. Ct. 1295
(1892); Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 24 S.
Ct. 349 (1904); Union Bridge Co. v. U. S., 204 U. S.
364, 27 S. Ct. 367 (1907); Mongahela Bridge Co. v.
U. S., 216 U. S. 177, 30 S. Ct. 356 (1910); U. S. v.
Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 31 S. Ct. 489 (1911); Hamp-
ton & Co. v. U. S., 276 U. S. 394, 48 S. Ct. 348 (1928);
Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. U. S., 288 U. S.
294, 53 S. Ct. 350 (1933).
39 .--------- U. S ---------- 55 S. Ct. 241 (1935).
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that section 9(c) (40) of the N. R. A. was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power to the President.
It must be remembered that this decision is very narrow. Section 9(c) is an
unique provision, aimed solely at "hot oil" shipments and has no counterpart in the
provisions relating to any other industries. It was held to be an invalid delegation
of legislative power because: (1) no general policy was stated; (2) there was no fixing
of standards by Congress;. and, (3) no finding of fact nor proclamation of this finding
was made by the President.
There have been no decisions in lower federal courts that any of the other pro-
visions of the N. R. A. are invalid as delegations of legislative power, although in
one case4 the court stated that it was convinced that the N. R. A. as a whole was
an invalid delegation of power, but since it was an inferior court it would not decide
the case on that basis, there being no precedent for ever holding an act of Congress
invalid for this reason.
(4) Miscellaneous Matters Arising under the N. R. 4.
One question which has arisen under the N. R. A. is who may bring a suit under
it. It appears that anyone may bring a suit to attack the Act who is seriously affected
by it, but in one case42 an employee was not allowed to test the validity of regu-
lations setting the maximum number of hours his employer could operate. The
court said that nothing in the code prevented the employer from hiring as many
nece sary or unnecessary employees as he desired.
As to suits to enforce the Act, the Federal Trade Commission can sue (in the
Circuit Court of Appeals) to enforce the codes since violation of them is unfair com-
petition. United States District Attorneys are expressly authorized in the act to
bring suits, but competitors have been denied the right13. The N. R. A. contains no
express provision authorizing a competitor to sue as does the Anti-Trust Act.
If employees wish to sue to enforce the act, under the Norris Act they have to
exhaust all the remedies (arbitration boards) provided for in the N. R. A.", and
even then it has not been settled that the employee is entitled to equitable relief 5.
But in several cases4" employees have been allowed to collect back wages for the
difference between what they actually received and the amount the code required
they should have been paid, as third party beneficiaries of a contract made between
the employer and the President.
One interesting case presented by the codes was that of State of Texas v. Standard
Oil Co. 7, where the defendant was being prosecuted for violation of the state anti-
trust act, the alleged violation having taken place before the adoption of the N. R. A.
40. "The President is authorized to prohibit the 43. J. F. Purvis et al. v. Bazemore, 5 F. S. 230
transportation in interstate and foreign commerce (S. D. Fla. 1933); Stanley v. Peabody Coal Co., 5
of petroleum and the products thereof produced or F. S. 612 (S. D. Ill. 1933); Western Powder Mfg.
withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount Co. v. Interstate Coal Co., S F. S. 619 (E. D. Ill.
permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage 1934); Chicago Flexible Shaft Co. v. Katz Drug Co.,
by any State law or valid regulation or order pre- 6 F. S. 193 (D. Del. 1934).
scribed thereunder ......... Any violation of any 44. John Stanley v. Peabody Coal Co., supra
order of the President issued under the provisions note 43.
of this subsection shall be punishable by fine ...... . 45. Ibid.
or imprisonment ..... or both." 46. Elizabeth Greleck v. Samuel Amsterdam,
41. U. S. v. Suburban Motor Service Corp., Mun. Ct. Phila, Federal Trade & Industry Service,
supra note 8, involving the code of Fair Competition Vol. II, p. 8156.
for the Petroleum Industry. 47. Dis. Ct. of Travis County, Texas, decided
42. Ralph Starring v. James B. Frazier, Jr., and Oct. 12, 1933, Federal Trade & Industry Service
Southern Mills, 4 F. S. 818 (D. Tenn. 1933). Yol. II p. 8004.
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The defendant set up as a defense that the acts complained of were legal and com-
pulsory under the N. R. A.; and since the Act has no saving clause, the court
refused to convict the defendant because the N. R. A. was the binding law in effect
at the time the conviction was sought. In this connection many final decrees for-
bidding certain acts are now being modified to the effect that nothing in them shall
be construed as forbidding the defendant to comply with all provisions of the
N. R. A.48
Few cases have arisen yet under the labor provisions of the Act. In one employ-
ees were allowed to sue as third party beneficiaries and enjoin the employer from
interfering with their right to join a union and bargain collectively49. In another
case the U. S. District Court refused to take jurisdiction of a suit which the de-
fendant union sought to remove from a state court. The union was being prosecuted
for carrying on an unlawful strike, and the union claimed that its acts were justified
by the N. R. A.50 In the case of J. & T. Cousins v. Shoe & Leather Workers Industrial
Union5" the court struck out the defense that the plaintiff was violating the N. R. A.
in the plaintiff's suit for an injunction against unlawful picketing. It seems that this
defense might have been good as invoking the doctrine of "unclean hands against the
plaintiff. It must be remembered in these labor disputes that the Norris-LaGuardia
Anti-Injunction Act holds that no U. S. court shall issue a permanent or temporary
injunction in a labor dispute without a hearing of witnesses in open court with an
opportunity to cross-examine.12
Any general summary of cases such as this is always unsatisfactory, and the
most that the writer can hope is that he has succeeded in a small measure in giving a
rough, cross-section view of the various types of cases arising under the National
Industrial Recovery Act and the varying decisions which have resultedi
*WILLIAM COLLINSON
*LL.B. '35
48. U. S. v. Southern Hardware Jobber's Assoc., 50. Motor Truck Assoc. of Western Mass., v.
U. S. Dis. Ct., E. D. of Vir., decided Nov. 24, 1933; Roy M. Dailey, U. S. Dis. Ct. of Mass., decided
U. S. v. Standard Oil of Calif., U. S. Dis. Ct., N. D. Dec. 8, 1933.
Calif., decided Sept., 1933. 51. Sup. Ct. of Kings County, N. Y., decided
49. Wisconsin State Federation of Labor v. Nov. 18, 1933, Federal Trade & Industry Service
Simplex Shoe Co., Cir. Ct. of Milwaukee Co., Wis., Vol. If, p. 8021.
decided Oct. 13, 1933, Federal Trade & Industry 52. U. S. v. Weirton Steel Co., 7 F. S. 255 (D.
Service Vol. II p. 8011. Del. 1934).
